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TORT LAW

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: EXPLAINING TORT LAW
MICHAEL STEVEN GREEN*
This Symposium is about the intersections between law and
morality. One way that the two can intersect is when moral
principles are used to explain the law, that is, to describe and
predict, in a fairly abstract way, what the law is like. There are at
least two reasons to use moral principles when undertaking such an
explanatory project. The first is that lawmakers usually claim to
take morality into consideration when doing their job. We would
therefore expect the law to track morality.
Of course, we might be disappointed. We may find that no
plausible set of moral principles can explain the law, but that
something morally neutral--or even morally reprehensible-can.
But to at least start with the considerations to which lawmakers
themselves appeal seems like a good idea.
The second reason to look to moral principles is that if they
succeed in explaining the law, they might then be used to justify it.
Trying to justify the law seems necessary, because the law is backed
up by the coercive power of the state and coercion is the kind of
thing that usually needs justification. Of course, that the content of
the law overlaps with morality might, in the end, do little or nothing
to justify state coercion. (Most people would certainly agree that it
is not sufficient to justify coercion-just because you morally ought
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale University,
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to cultivate your talents does not mean that anyone, even the state,
may force you to do so.) But justifying the law certainly looks easier
if the law requires people to do what they have a moral reason to do
anyway.
For the past forty years or so, tort law has proved to be an
exceptionally fruitful area for this type of explanatory project. A
good deal of moral theorizing about tort law has taken as its
starting point a rejection of the economic approach to torts. On the
one hand, these critics argue that the economic approach cannot
justify tort law, because efficiency is not a moral value. Perhaps
more important, however, they also argue that the economic
approach is explanatorily inadequate, for it mispredicts the positive
law of torts. They then offer sets of moral principles that can do a
better job explaining, for example, why the duties of conduct in tort
law have the content that they do, and why violations of these
duties generate the particular duties of repair that we find in tort
law, rather than some other-or no-form of reparation.
Both of our essays are examples of this explanatory project. In
Sleight of Hand, Ben Zipursky argues that Richard Posner's
economic understanding of the negligence standard is explanatorily
inadequate, for it cannot account for a number of aspects of the
positive law of torts, including (1) liability for negligence that is the
result of inadvertence rather than risk-taking,' (2) the employment
of standards of care higher or lower than negligence,2 and (3) the
relational character of the duty of care-that is, the fact that the
duty of care is a duty to the plaintiff.' What is more, Zipursky
argues that an economic understanding of the negligence standard
cannot be found in Learned Hand's opinion in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.,4 even though Posner pointed to Hand's opinion
as his inspiration.' Zipursky then offers an alternative conception
of the duty of care in negligence law that, he argues, resonates with
moral-and other nonlegal-norms of competence and considerateness in our behavior toward others.6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2017-18(2007).
Id. at 2019-21.
Id. at 2021-22.
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
Zipursky, supranote 1, at 2000.
Id. at 2033-40.
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Arthur Ripstein's essay, As If It Had Never Happened, seeks to
explain the particular form that the duty of repair takes in tort law,
in particular, the availability of money damages as a remedy. Money
damages are a puzzle, because money can do little to annul the
harm that the plaintiff suffered. It cannot make him "whole."
Ripstein starts with the fundamental question of the source of a
duty of repair, and argues that it is simply the form that an abiding
duty of conduct takes when its requirements are not satisfied.7 The
plaintiffs right that the defendant not wrong him survives the
commission of the wrong in the form of the defendant's duty of
repair. The two are analytically inseparable. Ripstein then argues
that the fundamental duty of conduct in tort is not to avoid harm,
but to refrain from depriving the plaintiff of the means that he has
at his disposal, or to avoid using the plaintiff's means in a way that
he has not authorized.8 The remedy of monetary damages honors
this duty in the breach because, although it can do little to annul
harms, it can give to the plaintiff means equivalent to those he lost,
or give to the plaintiff the gains that the defendant received from
his unauthorized use of the plaintiff's means.9

7. Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1961,
1978-82 (2007).
8. Id. at 1964-71.
9. Id. at 1971-72, 1982-87.

